

Ethnic Characterization of Gender-Inequality and Domestic Violence against Women of Reproductive Ages in Nigeria

Abayomi Samuel Oyekale

*Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension, North-West University Mafikeng Campus, Mmabatho 2735 South Africa
E-mail: asoyekale@gmail.com*

KEYWORDS Tribe. Domestic Violence. Human Rights. Constitution. Women

ABSTRACT Domestic violence against women is a social problem with no tribal distinction in Nigeria. This paper analyzed the forms of gender inequality and domestic violence and determines the factors promoting violence against women. The 2008 Demographic and Health Survey data were used. Factor Analysis and Bootstrapped Quantile regression method were used for data analysis. The results showed more dominance of men in decision making in tribes from northern Nigeria, while average domestic violence indicators were highest among the Tiv (0.5020) and Ibibio (0.4957) women. The factors that significantly increased domestic violence ($p > 0.05$) were the years of education of wife, involvement in labour market, watching TV and households' male headship, while it significantly reduced with age of women, number of wives, age of household heads, wife's access to newspaper and non-smoking husband. It was concluded that limitations in data availability restricts further probe into cultural reasons behind some of the results and that violence against women would reduce if child marriage is prohibited, smoking is banned and men are enlightened on the fundamental rights possessed by women in Nigerian constitutions.

INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence is a social problem that has attracted attention of policy makers in many international discourses. Several countries have now promulgated laws to protect the most vulnerable people in the society from abuse and violence that are often melted at them. In Nigeria, domestic violence can take the form of verbal abuse, discrimination, physical attacks, rape and deliberate denial of fundamental human rights. In some other instances, domestic violence can take the form of outright insinuation in matters of being suspected to be a witch, wizards, or possessing some strange spiritual influences. It can also bilaterally exist between parent and children, husband and wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law etc. without any whim of societal restriction or legal jurisdiction to vindicate the afflicted. Therefore, most of the times, people at the receiving end of domestic violence are girls and women that possess neither voice nor resources for seeking legal redress. Also, in many instances, requisite legislations to deal with some common violence are completely lacking, while other forms of violence are inflicted under the disguises of cultural obligations or religious rights (Tejumola 2007; Bazza 2009; Essien and Ukpong 2012).

Precisely, some cultural issues often give preferences to individual household members

based on sex, age and the order of birth. Therefore, just by the virtue of physical differences between male and female, some culturally or socially prescribed roles (gender issues) are already assigned, many of which promote domestic violence. The age of an individual may predispose him or her to child abuse under the pretence of instilling discipline. The order of birth may also subject an individual to neglect or denial of fundamental human right. In many instances, control of resources is concentrated in the hands of men, which may be sub-optimally allocated for enhancing households' welfare. Therefore, gender inequality can be a concentric antagonist to accomplishment and peaceful coexistence of households' members (Essien and Ukpong 2012).

Within the ambient of sociological theories, differences in economic empowerment across gender often stimulate inequality which sometimes stains households' hilarious peaceful coexistence with indescribable predicaments. However, some of these concepts have argued in favour of social stratification because the society is perceived to function as human body with different components performing different functions and ascribed different recognitions. This was the consensus theory of social agreement that culminated into the functional theory which was proposed by Davis and Moore (1945). It was noted that social stratification is functionally related to societal progress by ensuring its

stability. They argued in favour of social stratification from the perspective of differences in functionality of certain positions, failure of everyone to possess the requisite talents that can be converted into skills through training, and the need for preferential remunerations for those co-opted into functioning at that capacity. Functionalist theorists noted that men fill instrumental role in the society, while women perform some expressive roles. Therefore, ranking of men's roles above those of women often results in gender inequality. In some instances, resistance from women would often degenerate into domestic violence.

However, conflict theorists disagreed with functionalists on the fact that societal consensus on value is the driving force for social order. They sternly maintained that exercise of power by one social class is its preservative force. Therefore, difficulty in attainment of certain power by women is a driving force of gender inequality. The symbolic interactionists examined gender stratification on a day-to-day level. Specifically, "Herbert Blumer (1900–1987), who originated the term *symbolic interaction*, asserted that people do not respond directly to the world around them, but to the meaning they bring to it." Gender inequality can easily reflect in the manner and way that men treat women by taking their opinions very lightly and not minding to insult or interrupt them in conversations. Feminist theorists with subdivisions of liberal, socialist, radical and multiracial argued in favour of women on several propelling forces of gender inequality. Liberal feminists hinted that because past traditions were against progressive development of women, gender inequality resulted. The socialists traced activities of capitalists to gender inequality because women were used as cheap labour, while radical feminists submitted that the control that men had over the body of women brings about some form of gender inequality. Also, multiracial feminists submitted that the interactive influences of gender, race and social class shape the role assigned to women in the society.

It is however important to emphasize that the influences of gender inequality and domestic violence are diametrically detrimental to economic development and progress. This clearly explains why several international organizations have risen to ensure their eradication with legislative laws and societal reorientations. Howev-

er, though mostly under reported due to cultural factors (Afrolnews 2007), the reality of domestic violence in Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. Sometimes, it goes beyond physical injuries to include emotional tortures, physical seclusion and sometimes death.

Amnesty International (2005) reported that a third (and in some cases two-thirds) of women are believed to have been subjected to physical, sexual and psychological violence carried out primarily by husbands, partners and fathers, while girls are often forced into early marriage and are at risk of punishment if they attempt to escape from their husbands. More pathetic is the revelation of gross under reporting and non documentation of domestic violence due to cultural factors (Afrolnews 2007).

Aluko and Aluko-Arowolo (2007) submitted that gender-based domestic violence occurs in all local communities in Nigeria. Sometimes, women's inability to meet certain behavior standards already defined by socially acceptable norms subjects them to justifiable violence within the context of cultural proration. Specifically, Eifah et al. (1995) reported that women could be subjected to violence for failing to prepare food on time, suspicion on marital unfaithfulness and false accusation for involvement in witchcraft. CDC (2006) submitted that alcoholism, suffering of domestic violence as child and joblessness are critical risk factors predisposing someone to domestic violence. Similarly, Catalano et al. (2003) found that unemployment promotes provocative tendencies that promote domestic violence. Obi and Ozumba (2007) found that factors that promoted domestic violence include financial disparity in favour of women, influential in-laws, women education and couples within the same age group. Ezeah (2013) indicated that in a community in Enugu state, women's powerlessness in marriage relationship which is often linked to the marriage contractual processes is among the drivers of domestic violence. Also, child marriage and illiteracy of women (Ezeah 1996, 2013) have been attributed to gender-based domestic violence. Using a nationally representative data, this paper seeks to characterize gender inequality and domestic violence among major ethnic groups in Nigeria. It seeks to fulfill the objective of determining the nature of men's dominance in domestic decision making among married couples, characterizing domestic violence and constructing its composite indicator and determining socio-economic and tribal correlates.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

The Data

The study used the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data for Nigeria. The survey was comprehensive in coverage with samples drawn from all the states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The aspect of the survey where couples were interviewed was used. It focused on domestic violence, female genital mutilation and some issues of gender inequality within household. The data were those coded in the SPSS data file as the couple recode file (NGCR51FL) which was downloaded after receiving official permission from the data administrators (http://www.measuredhs.com/data/dataset/Nigeria_Standard-DHS_2008.cfm?Flag=1). The couple recode file consists of information from 8731 couples.

Analytical Model

Factor Analysis for Domestic Violence Indicator Construction

Factor analysis was used to aggregate the different forms of domestic violence into composite indicator. This was derived from the formula expressed as:

$$A_i = f_1(a_{i1} - a_1)/(s_1) + \dots + f_n(a_{in} - a_n)/(s_n) \quad ..1$$

$$A_i = \sum_{j=1}^n f_j (a_{ij} - a_j)/s_j \quad ..2$$

where A_i is the domestic violence exposure for each wife ($i=1 \dots n$), f_j is the scoring factor for each form of violence ($j=1, \dots, n$), a_{ij} is the j th form of domestic violence ($i, j=1, \dots, n$), a_j is the mean of i th form of domestic violence ($j=1, \dots, n$), and s_j is the standard deviation of j th form of domestic violence ($j=1, \dots, n$). In factor analysis, the scoring factors of the first principal component (the efficient component) were used for constructing the domestic violence indicator of each woman. The essence of computing the indicator is to synthesize all reported violence into composite value with perfect elimination of collinearity among them. In order to compute the indicator of domestic violence, affirmative answers to the following questions were coded 1 and 0 otherwise: forced for unwanted sex, beaten for sex refusal, jealous if talking with other men, accused of unfaithfulness, restricted in

meeting girl friends, husband limited her contact with family, husband insisted on knowing where she is, husband did not trust her with money, experienced any less severe violence, experienced any severe violence, experienced any sexual violence, anyone other than partner forced sex, anyone forced her to perform sexual acts, have ever told anyone else about violence, violence for delay in food preparation, violence for refusing to have another child, ever had bruises because of husband's act, ever had injury, sprain, dislocations or burns, ever had wounds, broken bones, broken teeth or other serious injuries, ever had severe burns, any injury as a result of husbands' actions, wounded husband when he was not hurting you, ever physically hurt by mother, ever physically hurt by father, ever physically hurt by sister/brother, ever physically hurt by teacher and being circumcised.

Factors Explaining Domestic Violence Indicator (DVI)- The Tobit Model

Because the computed DVI is a continuous variable, it is possible to determine the factors explaining it using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. However, the results from OLS rejected the normality and homoscedasticity tests thereby subjecting the parameters being biased and inefficient. These problems were resolved by the bootstrapped quantile regression to estimate the parameters. In this case, the equation was specified as:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_j \sum_{j=1}^k X_j + v_i \quad ..3$$

Where A_i is the domestic violence indicator of i th woman, X_j are the explanatory variables, $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ are the estimated parameters and v_i is the stochastic error term. The explanatory variables are age of women (years), urban residence (yes =1, 0 otherwise), number of wives, women's years of education, Catholic religion (yes=1, 0 otherwise), other Christians (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Islamic religion (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Yoruba tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Ekoi tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Fulani tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Hausa tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Ibibio tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Igala tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Igbo tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Ijaw tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Kanuri tribe (yes=1, 0 otherwise), household size, sex of household head (male = 1, 0 otherwise), age of household head (years), women reading newspaper (yes=1, 0 otherwise), women listening to radio (yes=1, 0 otherwise),

women watching TV (yes=1, 0 otherwise) (yes=1, 0 otherwise), Wealth Index, currently pregnant (yes=1, 0 otherwise), do not smoke (yes=1, 0 otherwise), women working (yes=1, 0 otherwise), men decide on how to spend money (yes=1, 0 otherwise), men have final say on health care (yes=1, 0 otherwise), men have final say on making large purchases (yes=1, 0 otherwise), men have final say on daily purchases (yes=1, 0 otherwise), men have final say on visit to family or relatives (yes=1, 0 otherwise), men have final say on what to do with husbands' money (yes=1, 0 otherwise) and women earned more than husbands (yes=1, 0 otherwise).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Involvement of the Wives in Households' Decision Making

Table 1 shows the distribution of the person that takes final decision on some domestic issues across the major tribes in Nigeria. The results reveal that decision on how to spend money was largely taken by the wives. Precisely, 85.46 percent, 78.65 percent, 68.91 percent, 60.82 percent of the wives from Ibibio, Hausa, Kanuri and Yoruba tribes respectively were the final decision takers on matters that are related to spending of family income. In the combined data, 64.49 percent of the wives were responsible for taking decision on how family income was spent. This is expected because women are always prudence in spending. Lawson and Gilman (2009) submitted that there is difference between spending habit of men and women. They reiterated that some husbands do understand the differences between them and their wives when it comes to prudence in domestic spending since women have higher tendencies of buying goods and services that would benefit everybody in the households.

The table further shows that husband were more involved in making final say on households' daily purchases. In the combined data, 54.03 percent of the husbands had final say on daily households' purchases, while 33.71 percent indicated that such decision is taken jointly between the wife and the husband. Only 11.98 percent of the wives indicated that they had the final say on daily purchases. Furthermore, husbands had final say on daily households' purchases with highest proportions among Hausa

(78.88 percent), Kanuri (77.36 percent) and Fulani (75.08 percent) tribes. The lowest percentage of 16.10 percent was computed for wives belonging to the Ibibio tribe. Also, 60.67 percent, 54.26 percent and 53.19 percent of Ekoi, Igala and Yoruba women respectively indicated that decision on household purchases were jointly made between them and their husbands. The findings are reflecting some dominance of husbands in deciding daily expenses, although joint involvement was also reported. The findings are also indicating more dominance of husbands in the major tribes from northern part of Nigeria. This can be explained from dominance of Islamic religion with doctrinal teachings that often suppress any fundamental right a woman would ever claim. It can also be explained from the traditional practice of child marriage and religious seclusion of wives.

In the combined data, Table 1 shows that 59.64 percent of the women indicated that their husbands were solely responsible for decision making on household health care, while wives had final say in 6.42 percent. However, 33.60 percent of the wives indicated that decisions on health care were jointly taken between them and their husbands. The results also show that in Hausa, Kanuri and Fulani tribes, 81.13 percent, 79.94 percent and 76.12 percent of the wives indicated that decisions on households' health care were solely taken by the husbands. Similarly, tribes with some form of equity in health care decision making due to joint involvement of husbands and wives were Ekoi (65.17 percent), Igala (58.14 percent), Igbo (51.74 percent) and Yoruba (48.10 percent). Husbands' decision to involve wives in health care decision making can be explained from the wealth of experience already accumulated from child care. The pattern of wives' involvement in decision making is also similar to that presented and previously discussed for decision on daily households' needs.

Final say on visit to relative was jointly taken by wives and husbands in 44.18 percent of the total households, while husbands were solely responsible in 47.27 percent. However, 8.22 percent of the wives were solely involved in taking decision on visitation of relatives. Among the Ekoi, Ibibio, Tiv and Yoruba tribes, the proportions of women that indicated that decisions on visitation of relations were jointly made constituted 84.27 percent, 70.34 percent, 65.39 percent and 58.00 percent, respectively. Also, tribes

Table 1: Final decision making on households' economic activities as reported by women

Tribe	Wife	Wife and husband	Husband	Someone else	Other	Total	Wife	Wife and husband	Husband	Someone else	Other	Total
	<i>Who decides how to spend money</i>											
Ekoi	20.00	68.00	12.00	0.00	0.00	25	33.71	60.67	5.62	0.00	0.00	89
Fulani	78.65	6.43	14.04	0.00	0.88	342	2.62	21.64	75.08	0.33	0.00	915
Hausa	85.46	4.25	9.98	0.00	0.31	1,293	2.38	18.58	78.88	0.16	0.00	2,476
Ibibio	51.32	39.47	9.21	0.00	0.00	76	44.92	38.98	16.10	0.00	0.00	118
Igala	43.48	43.48	13.04	0.00	0.00	69	25.58	54.26	20.16	0.00	0.00	129
Igbo	34.24	37.79	27.97	0.00	0.00	479	27.25	43.49	29.26	0.00	0.00	745
Ijaw/ Izon	47.71	25.69	26.61	0.00	0.00	109	33.63	40.36	25.11	0.90	0.00	223
Kanuri/ Beriberi	68.91	6.72	24.37	0.00	0.00	119	1.57	19.81	77.36	0.94	0.31	318
Tiv	37.61	41.28	21.10	0.00	0.00	109	30.20	40.59	28.22	0.99	0.00	202
Yoruba	60.82	28.19	10.99	0.00	0.00	901	16.00	53.19	30.62	0.09	0.09	1,081
Others	58.44	24.95	16.51	0.00	0.09	1,054	13.59	40.51	45.69	0.17	0.04	2,355
Total	64.49	20.39	14.95	0.00	0.17	4,576	11.98	33.71	54.03	0.22	0.07	8,651
	<i>Final say on own health care</i>											
Ekoi	3.37	65.17	31.46	0.00	0.00	89	7.87	84.27	7.87	0.00	0.00	89
Fulani	2.51	20.61	76.12	0.55	0.22	917	4.58	29.01	65.98	0.22	0.22	917
Hausa	2.51	16.16	81.13	0.20	0.00	2,475	2.34	30.80	66.53	0.28	0.04	2,474
Ibibio	11.02	49.15	39.83	0.00	0.00	118	9.32	70.34	20.34	0.00	0.00	118
Igala	12.40	58.14	29.46	0.00	0.00	129	12.40	65.89	21.71	0.00	0.00	129
Igbo	9.25	51.74	38.87	0.13	0.00	746	11.13	58.85	29.76	0.13	0.13	746
Ijaw/ Izon	6.73	43.05	49.33	0.90	0.00	223	15.70	52.02	31.84	0.45	0.00	223
Kanuri/ Beriberi	1.25	16.93	79.94	1.25	0.63	319	2.82	27.90	68.03	0.94	0.31	319
Tiv	8.42	41.58	49.50	0.50	0.00	202	6.44	61.39	29.70	1.49	0.99	202
Yoruba	16.47	48.10	35.34	0.00	0.09	1,081	20.63	58.00	21.37	0.00	0.00	1,081
Others	6.62	41.94	51.19	0.13	0.13	2,358	9.08	49.11	41.60	0.21	0.00	2,356
Total	6.42	33.60	59.64	0.24	0.09	8,657	8.22	44.18	47.27	0.25	0.08	8,654
	<i>Final say on making large household purchases</i>											
Ekoi	3.37	75.28	21.35	0.00	0.00	89	3.33	53.33	43.33	0.00	0.00	90
Fulani	1.42	18.54	79.39	0.33	0.33	917	9.41	10.28	76.91	0.22	3.17	914
Hausa	1.82	14.72	83.21	0.20	0.04	2,472	5.17	11.47	82.40	0.00	0.97	2,477
Ibibio	4.24	39.83	55.93	0.00	0.00	118	1.71	44.44	53.85	0.00	0.00	117
Igala	8.53	53.49	37.98	0.00	0.00	129	8.53	41.86	48.84	0.00	0.78	129
Igbo	5.91	50.13	43.95	0.00	0.00	744	2.84	42.84	54.05	0.00	0.27	740
Ijaw/ Izon	6.73	36.77	55.61	0.90	0.00	223	3.17	31.67	62.90	0.00	2.26	221
Kanuri/ Beriberi	0.94	15.36	82.13	1.25	0.31	319	4.42	9.15	85.49	0.32	0.63	317
Tiv	14.36	38.61	46.04	0.99	0.00	202	2.49	39.80	54.23	0.50	2.99	201
Yoruba	3.52	49.40	46.99	0.09	0.00	1,081	5.48	32.90	61.52	0.09	0.00	1,076
Others	4.75	41.45	53.59	0.13	0.08	2,357	6.65	32.11	60.04	0.09	1.11	2,345
Total	3.68	32.48	63.53	0.23	0.08	8,651	5.70	24.75	68.37	0.08	1.10	8,627

from northern Nigeria had highest proportions of the husband solely deciding on visitation to relatives with Kanuri, Hausa and Fulani having 68.03 percent, 66.53 percent and 65.98 percent, respectively.

Table 1 also shows that in the combined data, 63.53 percent of the wives indicated their husbands were solely responsible for decision making on large purchases. However, 32.48 percent indicated that decisions on large purchases were made jointly by wives and husbands. Among the Hausa, Kanuri and Fulani tribes, 83.21 percent, 82.13 percent and 79.39 percent of the wives respectively indicated that their husbands were solely responsible for making decision on large purchases. Also, among the Ekoi, Igala and Yoruba tribes, 75.28 percent, 53.49 percent and 49.40 percent of the wives respectively indicated that decisions on making large purchases were jointly made with their husbands.

The table also shows the distribution of involvement of husband and wives in deciding how husbands spent their personal money. It reveals that 68.37 percent of the wives indicated that husbands unilaterally decide on how their incomes would be spent. Only 24.75 percent indicated that decisions on how husbands' incomes were spent were taken jointly with them. Also, unilateral decision making by the husbands were largely reported among Kanuri (85.49 percent), Hausa (82.40 percent) and Fulani (76.91 percent). However, 53.33 percent of the Ekoi tribe, 44.44 percent of Ibibio tribe and 42.84 percent of Igbo women were jointly involved in deciding how the husbands spent their incomes. Unilateral decision making on how husbands spend their money can be critically determined by several factors such as prudence of woman in spending money on essential commodities, involvement of women in the labour market and socio-cultural issues that may forbid a woman to query how her husband manages his finances.

Different Forms of Domestic Violence against Women

Table 2 shows the distribution of the different forms of domestic violence that the wives reported to have gone through. It reveals that 26.96 percent of the wives from Kanuri tribe indicated that their husband could force them for unwanted sex. This is the highest percentage among all tribes, while Yoruba, Ekoi and Igbo

had lowest percentages with 0.83 percent, 2.17 percent and 2.67 percent, respectively. The results also show that 39.50 percent of the wives from Kanuri tribe and 22.77 percent of the Tivs indicated that their husbands could beat them for refusing sex. However, only 5.04 percent, 5.48 percent and 6.01 percent of the wives from Ibibio, Igbo and Yoruba indicated that they could be beaten for refusing to have sex with their husbands. Husbands' power over the body of the wives and desire to resort into violence if denied is traditionally vested in the roles that are played by men in marriage contracts. Ifemeje (2008) submitted that the husband exercises exclusive sexual rights on the wife, who is often regarded as his "property". No doubt, therefore, some husbands exercise such egoism to fulfill their selfish interest by treating their wives just as a property not minding that they also have emotional feelings.

Furthermore, the results show that many of the wives indicated that their husbands were always jealous if they are talking with other men with 50.00 percent, 44.26 percent, 43.41 percent and 43.07 percent from Ekoi, Hausa, Igala and Tiv tribes respectively. Also, 25.74 percent of Tiv, 20.65 percent of Ekoi and 18.67 percent of Ijaw wives indicated that their husbands accused them of unfaithfulness. Restrictions in meeting girlfriends were reported by 19.33 of Ibibio, 18.32 percent of Tiv and 17.78 percent of Ijaw wives. The results further show that 9.22 percent, 8.53 percent and 7.21 percent of the wives from Igbo, Igala and Kanuri tribes reported that their husbands limited their contacts with family members. These are the highest percentages, while women from Ekoi and Yoruba tribes reported the lowest percentages with 1.09 and 3.24, respectively. The position of a woman in marriage relationships is first clearly marked and demarcated by her faithfulness to her husband, while men often take the liberty not to reciprocate. This is perfectly enunciated in traditional and religious acceptance of men's decisions to have two or more wives (polygamy), whereas it is a shameful matter for a woman to be caught with a concubine. Therefore, although men often jealously dissuade their wives from extra-marital affairs, similar faithfulness is never paid back. Sometimes, such restrictions in friendship may be extended to their association with female friends and even family members.

Table 2: Tribal distribution of women according to the forms domestic violence experienced

<i>Form of domestic violence</i>	<i>Ekoi</i>	<i>Fulani</i>	<i>Hausa</i>	<i>Ibibio</i>	<i>Igala</i>	<i>Igbo</i>	<i>Ijaw</i>	<i>Kanuri</i>	<i>Tiv</i>	<i>Yoruba</i>	<i>Others</i>
Forced unwanted sex	2.17	9.35	8.90	6.72	8.53	2.67	2.67	26.96	6.44	0.83	11.38
Beat for sex refusal	7.61	17.50	11.96	5.04	13.18	5.48	9.33	39.50	22.77	6.01	19.75
Jealous if talking with other men	50.00	35.43	44.26	31.09	43.41	34.76	39.56	42.63	43.07	37.65	36.72
Accused of unfaithfulness	20.65	7.93	6.44	11.76	6.20	9.49	18.67	12.85	25.74	8.60	13.20
Restrictions in meeting girl friends	10.87	7.93	7.29	19.33	10.85	13.90	17.78	11.60	18.32	8.23	10.91
Husband limits her contact with family	1.09	5.22	4.79	5.88	8.53	9.22	7.56	7.21	5.94	3.24	6.05
Husband insists on knowing where she is	43.48	24.89	21.91	32.77	41.86	29.95	33.78	24.45	31.19	32.28	28.60
Husband doesn't trust her with money	33.70	9.89	9.71	25.21	12.40	17.25	17.33	15.99	13.37	14.34	15.23
Experienced any less severe violence	18.48	4.35	4.47	26.89	17.83	18.98	21.78	6.58	29.70	11.19	19.29
Experienced any severe violence	5.43	0.87	0.97	14.29	3.88	8.29	7.56	1.57	19.80	3.61	7.02
Experienced any sexual violence	3.26	1.85	1.61	9.24	2.33	5.75	6.22	1.88	4.95	1.20	3.93
Anyone other than partner forced sex	2.17	0.76	0.64	2.52	0.78	1.87	1.33	2.82	0.99	0.28	0.72
Anyone forced her to perform sexual acts	5.43	2.07	1.49	6.72	1.55	4.01	2.67	3.13	9.90	0.56	3.43
Violence for delay in food preparation	38.04	26.41	19.81	14.29	31.78	15.64	12.00	22.26	29.70	14.43	22.93
Violence for refusing to have another child	1.09	22.17	14.74	6.72	29.46	8.16	10.67	27.27	24.26	5.18	21.24
Ever had bruises because of husband's act	1.09	1.09	0.93	8.40	4.65	5.08	10.22	1.25	4.46	2.87	4.95
Ever had injury, sprain, dislocations or burns	0.00	0.43	0.16	1.68	0.78	2.41	1.78	0.63	5.45	1.02	1.99
Ever had wounds, broken bones, broken teeth or other serious	0.00	0.00	0.08	1.68	0.00	2.41	3.11	0.63	1.49	0.28	0.68
Ever had severe burns	0.00	0.87	0.36	0.84	1.55	1.07	2.67	0.94	0.50	0.46	1.06
Wounded husband when he was not hurting you	4.35	0.00	0.28	9.24	2.33	2.27	3.11	0.63	4.95	1.39	2.66
Ever physically hurt by mother	6.52	1.85	2.50	22.69	1.55	4.14	5.78	3.45	9.41	8.79	5.50
Ever physically hurt by father	1.09	0.87	1.01	13.45	2.33	3.48	3.56	3.45	8.91	7.59	3.60
Ever physically hurt by sister/brother	6.52	0.98	1.37	5.88	2.33	2.67	9.33	3.13	5.94	3.24	3.05
Ever physically hurt by teacher	0.00	0.11	0.40	12.61	3.10	2.67	2.22	0.00	3.47	4.53	2.16

Some of the wives reported that their husbands insisted in knowing where they were. However, in some cases, domestic violence ensues if the wife takes offense by insisting that she is old enough to take care of herself. Precisely, 43.48 percent of wives from Ekoi tribe, 41.86 percent from Igala tribe and 33.78 percent from Ijaw tribe reported that their husbands were insisting in knowing every details about their whereabouts. However, respondents from tribes in northern Nigeria had lower percentages with 21.91, 24.45 and 24.89 for Hausa, Kanuri and Fulani tribes respectively. This can be explained from the fact that some wives in northern Nigeria by Islamic teachings can be subjected to seclusion which makes it abominable to expose their faces and restricts their movements in the society.

The table also presents information on husbands' trust of wives with money. This reflects some differences across the tribes with Ekoi, Ibibio, Ijaw and Igbo tribes having highest percentages of 33.70, 25.21, 17.33 and 17.25, respectively. Previous experience of less severe violence was reported by 29.70 percent, 26.89 percent and 21.78 percent of the women from Tiv, Ibibio and Ijaw tribes, respectively. These are the highest percentages among the tribes, while Fulani and Hausa had lowest percentages of 4.35 and 4.47, respectively. Similarly, more women from Tiv and Ibibio reported experience of severe violence with 19.80 percent and 14.29 percent, respectively. Sexual violence was least reported among Yoruba, Hausa and Fulani tribes with 1.20 percent, 1.61 percent and 1.85 percent, respectively. Across all the tribes, fewer proportions of the women had been forcefully engaged in sexual activities by people that were not their partners. Specifically, this was reported by 2.82 percent, 2.52 percent and 2.17 percent of the wives from Kanuri, Ibibio and Ekoi tribes respectively.

Violence that resulted from delay in food preparation was reported by 38.04 percent, 31.78 percent and 29.70 percent of the women from Ekoi, Igala and Tiv tribes respectively. However, violence that resulted from refusing to have another child was mostly reported by 29.46 percent, 27.27 percent and 24.26 percent of the women from Igala, Kanuri and Tiv tribes, respectively. Also, 10.22 percent and 8.40 percent of the women from Ijaw and Ibibio respectively reported that they had bruises because of husbands' acts. Also, 9.24 percent, 4.95 percent and 4.35

percent of the women reported that they hurt their husband when he never intended to hurt them. Among those that reported to have been hurt by their mothers, fathers and teachers, Ibibio tribe had the highest percentages with 22.69 percent, 13.45 percent and 12.61 percent respectively.

Composite Indicator of Domestic Violence

In the Factor Analysis results, 12 Factors were retained for having positive Eigen values. These were used to synthesize different forms of domestic violence against women into composite indicator. The forms of violence with highest uniqueness values were being circumcised (90.26 percent), anyone beside partner forced sex (89.54 percent), any other one forced sex (85.81 percent) and hurt husband when not hurting (82.99 percent). Also, those forms of domestic violence with lowest uniqueness were ever physically hurt by mother (40.43 percent) and beaten for refusal to have more children (43.44 percent). The composite domestic violence indicators were predicted using regression option in Factor Analysis post-estimation with STATA 12.0 software.

Table 3 shows the distribution of composite domestic violence indicators across the different tribes. It shows that Tiv women had the highest average domestic violence with 0.5020 and standard deviation of 1.3478. Ibibio women had average domestic violence of 0.4957 with standard deviation of 1.3490. However, women from Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri tribes had the lowest average domestic violence of -0.1974, -0.1796 and -0.0358, respectively.

Table 3: Average domestic violence indicators across the Nigerian tribes

<i>Tribe</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>
Ekoi	92	0.1532	0.7178
Fulani	920	-0.1796	0.6286
Hausa	2,483	-0.1974	0.5767
Ibibio	119	0.4957	1.3490
Igala	129	0.0855	0.7805
Igbo	748	0.1725	1.1639
Ijaw	225	0.3361	1.2888
Kanuri	319	-0.0358	0.9342
Tiv	202	0.5020	1.3478
Yoruba	1,081	-0.0347	0.7923
Others	2,413	0.1301	1.0656
All	8,731	0.0000	0.9125

Factors Explaining Domestic Violence

Table 4 shows results of the Bootstrapped Quantile regression. It reveals that the parameter of age (-0.0040) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This implies that as the age of the wives increased, domestic violence indicator significantly decreased. This is expected because mature wives should have experiences which would enhance better understanding and peaceful co-existence between them and their husbands. Child marriage had been traced to domestic violence because the child wife is not able to meet basic requirements of a wife. Such relationship may be full of crises and since the husband is the age mate of the girl's father, the wife may be subjected to several derogatory treatments.

The parameter of number of husband's wives (-0.0488) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This implies that as the number of wives in-

creased, domestic violence indicator significantly reduced. This finding reflects multiplicity of relationship which may reduce the attention given to each of the wives. It may also reflect the tendency of wives in polygamous relationships not to take serious offences in husbands' behaviours some of which may hurt in a monogamous relationship.

The parameter of the years of wife's education (0.0057) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This shows that as wives acquire more education, their exposure to domestic violence significantly increased. Wives' education and domestic violence can be explained from the perspective of right claiming and inability to succumb to some cultural norms. An educated woman understands what her rights are in the society and may not be easily subjected to cultural practices and norms that often suppress women in marital relationships. This may generate conflicts and

Table 4: Factors explaining domestic violence based on Bootstrapped Quantile regression results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard error</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Level of significance</i>
Age of women	-0.0040	0.0008	-4.88	0.0000
Urban residence	0.0072	0.0126	0.57	0.5660
Number of wives	-0.0488	0.0062	-7.88	0.0000
Women's years of education	0.0057	0.0021	2.70	0.0070
Women working	0.0418	0.0110	3.79	0.0000
Catholic religion	-0.0070	0.0544	-0.13	0.8980
Other Christians	-0.0026	0.0504	-0.05	0.9590
Islamic religion	-0.0648	0.0396	-1.64	0.1020
Yoruba tribe	-0.0438	0.0247	-1.77	0.0760
Ekoi tribe	0.3335	0.1691	1.97	0.0490
Fulani tribe	-0.0555	0.0171	-3.25	0.0010
Hausa tribe	-0.0443	0.0147	-3.00	0.0030
Ibibio tribe	0.1766	0.1172	1.51	0.1320
Igala tribe	0.1355	0.0441	3.07	0.0020
Igbo tribe	-0.0816	0.0307	-2.66	0.0080
Ijaw tribe	0.0209	0.0709	0.29	0.7690
Kanuri tribe	-0.0349	0.0254	-1.38	0.1690
Household size	-0.0073	0.0015	-4.87	0.0000
Sex of household head	0.1200	0.0481	2.49	0.0130
Age of household head	-0.0019	0.0008	-2.49	0.0130
Women reading newspaper	-0.0576	0.0223	-2.58	0.0100
Women listening to radio	-0.0127	0.0130	-0.98	0.3280
Women watching TV	0.0319	0.0158	2.02	0.0440
Wealth Index	0.0000	0.0000	-0.87	0.3860
Currently pregnant	0.0018	0.0136	0.13	0.8970
Husbands do not smoke	-0.0471	0.0180	-2.61	0.0090
Men decide on how to spend money	-0.0356	0.0163	-2.19	0.0290
Men have final say on health care	0.0283	0.0227	1.25	0.2110
Men have final say on making large purchases	0.0195	0.0250	0.78	0.4340
Men have final say on daily purchases	0.0259	0.0273	0.95	0.3420
Men have final say on visit to family or relatives	-0.0526	0.0140	-3.77	0.0000
Men have final say on what to do with husbands' money	-0.0340	0.0127	-2.68	0.0070
Women earned more than husbands	-0.0889	0.1708	-0.52	0.6030
Constant	-0.0563	0.0788	-0.71	0.4750

breed serious domestic violence. This finding is similar to that of Obi and Ozumba (2007).

Similarly, the parameter of working woman (0.0418) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This implies that wives that were working had higher domestic violence indicator than those that were not working. Engagement of wives in the labour market had been found to influence domestic violence by Ozumba (2007). There are different reasons to explain this. First, a working woman may not have ample time for domestic works, thereby leading to family chaos. It is also possible that involvement in labour market influences a woman's fertility preference or brings about some competitions with the husband.

The parameters of Fulani tribe (-0.0555), Hausa tribe (-0.0443) and Igbo tribe (-0.0816) are all statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Also, the parameters Ekoi tribe (0.3335) and Igala (0.1355) are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). These results have also shown that although statistically insignificant ($p > 0.05$), the estimated parameters for Yoruba and Kanuri tribes are also with negative sign, while that for Ijaw and Ibibio tribes had positive sign.

Household size parameter (-0.0073) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and shows that increase in household size reduces domestic violence. This may have resulted from the fact that households with many children would have accumulated experience that can foster peaceful coexistence. This is particularly important because the parameter of age (-0.0019) is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and implies that as household head age increases, domestic violence reduces. The result in respect of sex of household head also implies that wives in male headed households are prone to more domestic violence than those in households that are headed by females.

The parameters of reading newspaper and watching television are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Precisely, wives that were reading newspaper had lower domestic violence indicator, while those that were watching television had higher values. Although access to media programmes is expected to promote peaceful relationship between couples, sometimes, personal traits, upbringing and other socio-cultural issues that are critical for peaceful coexistence between husband and wife cannot be easily influenced by these programmes.

The parameter of husband not smoking (-0.0471) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and

implies that wives with partners that were not smoking had lower domestic violence indicator. This is expected because husbands that smoke can be prone to being violent because they are likely to be drunkards. However, the parameters of gender inequality that were statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) are husbands decide on how to spend the money (-0.0356), husbands decide on visit to family (-0.0526) and husbands decide on how to spend their money (-0.0340). These show that dominance of husbands in these domestic affairs does not promote domestic violence against wives.

CONCLUSION

Domestic violence against women is a growing social problem in many countries in the world. Although sometimes perpetrated in secluded places under several cultural and societal norms, the outcomes which may be emotional trauma, physical injuries, death or permanent psychological damages cannot be disgustfully hidden. The gravity of violence melted at women is a function of several factors, among which inherent inequality in marital relationships is foremost. This study found more dominance of husbands from tribes in northern part of Nigeria in some decisions affecting households. It was evident from the results that women were largely recognized in how household income is spent, though men's role as primary decision makers were evident in daily purchases, large purchases, family health needs, visitation to families and how men's personal incomes were spent. Forceful sexual relationships which may sometimes be associated with beaten were reported with highest percentages among wives from Kanuri tribe. The average composite domestic violence indicators were highest among wives from Tiv and Ibibio tribes. The factors that significantly increased domestic violence were the years of education of wife, involvement in labour market, watching TV and households' male headship, while it reduced with age of women, number of wives, age of household heads, wife's access to newspaper and non-smoking husband. The results pointed at dominance of men in decision making which surprisingly did not promote domestic violence. This underscores adjustment tendency of wives to circumstances around them by ensuring that

they maintain peace in situations that are culturally, socially, economically and emotionally beyond their control.

One of the finding pointed at the need to ensure some maturity in marriage contracts. Another one pointed at the need to promote husbands' tolerance and understanding if their wives are employed in the labour market. Generally, however, there is need for media awareness creation on the Nigeria's newly promulgated law against any form of gender-based violence whichever way and where it exists. Furthermore, a gradual move towards prohibition of smoking by banning it would assist in ensuring more peace at home. Although this paper explored some tribal perspectives of gender inequality and domestic violence, it was difficult to clearly explore some deep cultural influences because of the nature of the data. It would be interesting if those deep rooted cultural issues are explored within the context of discussions presented. Therefore, further studies can concentrate on particular tribe with deep probe into those cultural issues in a more informal investigation.

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